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Abstract 
A peace process almost always acts as the catalyst to transition from conflict.  In reality, the peace process 
is usually dominated by peace negotiations between the main contending parties who are able to direct 
the content and progress of the movement towards peace.  However, as conflicts rarely reduce into 
bilateral disputes, the elite nature of peace talks can exclude or ignore broader, cross-cutting interests in 
society.  Using the Sri Lankan peace process as the central case study, this article explores both the 
illegitimacy of containing the peace process at the macro-level and the valuable contribution of civil 
society subordinated in the efforts to achieve peace.  The article concludes that all levels of society must 
be engaged in peace processes in order to realise a deep and sustainable peace. 
 
 
 
The framework and impetus of peace processes very often focus on bilateral 
negotiations between central political actors with the assistance of an external third party 
mediator.  While each peace process contains its own complex and contextual 
particularities, transitions in societies as diverse as Colombia, Israel/Palestine and 
Northern Ireland share the common feature of elevating elite-based and exclusive peace 
negotiations to the centre of the broader movement towards of peace.  Broader society is 
only afforded a subordinated role at the peripheries, however strong its organisation and 
capacity. 
This paper explores the potential hegemonic effects of a central focus on peace 
talks.  As conflicts rarely reduce simply into a linear dispute between two sides, the 
perspectives and interests of many other parties may be left out of the negotiations.  
Rather, the framework of the peace talks reduces the broad and often conflicting and 
cross-cutting experiences of society through an aggregation process which produces a 
intelligible yet simplistic narrative.  As such, Part I of the paper locates elite-driven peace 
processes within a history of colonial and post-colonial formations through cyclic 
repetitions of power and highlights the instability of a peace reached on an exclusionary 
and appropriating basis.  This section includes a discussion on the further distancing of 
society from participation in its own present and future through the involvement of the 
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international community without a simultaneous reach inwards.  This section emphasises 
that the involvement of the international community reflects both an inevitable and 
important development of contemporary peace processes but underlines that without a 
corollary increase in the participation of broader society can lead to further 
disenfranchisement and instability.   
Part II provides a case-study of the peace process in Sri Lanka to demonstrate the 
impact of hegemonic peace talks on the overall project for peace.  As a society suspended 
in a state of no-war/no-peace since the Ceasefire Agreement of 2002, the devastation 
facing Sri Lanka as a result of the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004 initially 
raised hopes of a resumption of the stalled peace talks between the government of Sri 
Lanka (GOSL) and the rebel faction, the LTTE (also known as the Tamil Tigers), which 
controls many parts of the North and East of the island.  The unity was only short-lived 
however.  The parties are already divided on the rehabilitation efforts and political 
killings have once again resumed.  At this stage, the future of the peace process must be 
considered with particular attention to the disenfranchisement of broader society through 
the lack of a participatory role in previous negotiations.  As a result, this section 
examines the impact of the structure of the bilateral negotiations in Sri Lanka as enabling 
the parties to hold society in a state of no war/no peace without any sequencing or 
progression towards a permanent peace.  In particular, the section addresses the 
continuance of human rights violations throughout the ceasefire period as an inevitable 
consequence of the bilateral structure which subordinates the rights of individuals to the 
overarching concern of peace.   
Finally, Part III locates the case-study on Sri Lanka within a broader analytical 
discussion of the need to ensure deeper peace processes with particular focus on inclusion 
and broad participation as well as the integration of a comprehensive human rights 
framework. 
   
 
Part I:  The Hegemonic Impact of Bilateral Peace Processes 
 
This section considers the negative impact hegemonic, elite-based peace processes 
can have on the larger project for peace.  First, the section looks at the legitimacy of the 
occupation of public space by the two main contending actors.  The section then 
considers the general implications of the involvement of the international community 
without a simultaneous reach inwards to broader society.   
In order to provide a conceptual and overarching framework for the elite-nature of 
the peace talks, the paper refers to the “macro” and “supra-macro” levels of society to 
depict the distance the main political actors to the peace talks and the international 
community respectively operates from broader society. 
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Cyclic Repetitions of Power  
 
Despite the complexity of conflicts, the enclosure of transitional discussions at the 
macro level produces a reductive effect of simplifying the experience and demands of 
parties to the conflict, thus narrowing the scope of history and the potential to move 
forward.  In the Sri Lankan context, for example, the official and external portrayal of the 
conflict emphasises only the relationship between the Sinhalese as an aggregated 
community and the LTTE as ‘representatives’ of the Tamil people.  This depiction 
ignores the current and past involvement of other actors, such as the Muslim community 
and the People’s Liberation Front (JVP).  The concentration negates the possible 
connection of actors bearing multiple identities, reacting and moving in and out of 
identities permanently or transiently.  Yet, the framework to the peace process in Sri 
Lanka is hardly unique.  In most peace processes, the negotiations between key powerful 
actors form the focus and point of reference in the project towards peace.     
The justification for the centrality of elite-based peace talks depends on the 
connection of the process to broader society.  Shapiro and Hacker-Cordon (1999) refer to 
“outer” and “inner” edges in their edited collection of essays on the contours of 
democracy.  By analogy, the location of power in the peace process shapes its content 
and progression.  The restriction of the peace process to the main contending parties and 
increasingly the international community results in an aggregation of interests to the 
“outer-edges” without a parallel reach inwards to the “inner edges” which more fully 
reflect the broad diversity and tensions within and between the elite and grassroots levels 
of society.  Given the range and often contesting positions of the various cleavages within 
society, the reduction or aggregation of their experiences may lead to exclusion and 
potential sites for new or prolonged conflict (Shapiro and Hacker-Cordon, 1999, 26).  
Thus the macro focus of peace processes may then lead to what Habermas (2002, 150) 
calls “dangerous legitimation deficiencies” which ultimately may threaten the premise of 
established peace. Without participation, the focus on the outer edge of transition and the 
establishment of peace at all costs may produce a modern form of colonialism negotiated 
by substituted powerful actors but resulting in the same appropriation of experience and 
disenfranchisement in the content or structure of the emerging society.   
Otto’s (1999) discussion of international law demonstrates the way in which elite-
driven peace processes reflect a continuation of colonial forms of engagement.  In the 
process of decolonisation in India, the colonial power predetermined the post-colonial 
formation of the state by only making available the possibility of decolonisation to 
mirror-images of the “modern European nation-state.”  As a result, the acceding power-
holders continued to operate within a European frame, producing cycles of imperialism 
upon the subaltern through the veil of nationalism (Otto, 1999, 147, 153, 164).  Habermas 
(2002, 142) supports this interpretation of decolonisation through his assertion that, “[f]or 
the most part new nation-states emerge at the expense of assimilated, suppressed, or 
marginalized “subaltern” peoples.  The formation of nation-states under the banner of 
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ethnonationalism has almost always been accompanied by bloody purification rituals, and 
it has generally exposed new minorities to new waves of repression.”  Further, separate 
from the “mass of Indian people”, Otto (1999, 159) draws on the work of Guha to 
demonstrate how the elite located the achievement of decolonisation within its own 
identity, claiming the emancipation of subaltern groups through the dismissal and 
appropriation of their independent contribution and initiation. Thus, Otto argues that both 
the colonial power and the elites that assumed power, silenced and excluded the 
contribution and participation of the subaltern.   
Santos (2002, 109) explores the relationship between silence as a “scarce 
resource” and language to demonstrate the way in which powerful actors can command 
the space of what is and is not addressed: 
 
When language is important, the ruling classes tend to appropriate it, imposing 
silence upon the people … Conversely, when silence is important, the ruling 
classes tend to appropriate it, relegating language to the people … Silence is not 
an indiscriminate absence of language, but rather, the self-denial of specific words 
at specific moments of the discourse so that the communication process may be 
fulfilled.  What is silenced, therefore, is a positive expression of meaning. 
 
On Santos’ understanding of language and silence, the appropriation of discourse 
by the powerful actors determines the importance of issues included in the peace process 
and irrelevance of issues excluded.  Anything outside of this space, like human rights and 
the needs and interests of parties beyond the dominant actors, is enclosed in the silent 
space, encompassing the issues which are not deemed relevant or appropriate for the 
process towards peace.  Thus, the acceptance of the containment of the peace process at 
the macro level allows for the adoption of rhetoric to ensure power constellations to the 
detriment of the internal boundaries. 
On the surface, the concentration of actors in peace talks appeals to pragmatism in 
the need for a political solution to end hostilities.  Yet, the strength of any agreement 
reached through an exclusive negotiation is potentially undermined if the needs and 
interests of broader society are not adequately represented.  In times of conflict, society is 
often fragmented and divided.  Power constellations may exist, particularly between elite 
and grassroots civil society organizations, which can prove divisive.  The complexity of 
the societal make-up therefore renders the main contending parties incapable of speaking 
on behalf of the diversity of goals and perspectives within society.  The analogy of the 
failure of both authoritarian and democratic political entities in supposedly “stable” 
communities – which do not face the further challenges of emergence from conflict – to 
advance the range of competing interests of their constituencies perhaps undermines the 
justification of the primacy of bilateral negotiations.  This is particularly supported by 
Habermas’ (2002, 117-8) explanation of the erosion of the nation-state as, in part, due to 
the fact that pluralist societies do not reflect the “model of a nation-state based on a 
culturally homogenous population.”  Rather, he (Habermas, 2002, 117-8) argues that the 
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fusion between the “majority culture [and the] political sphere … must be dissolved if it 
is to be possible for different cultural, ethnic, and religious forms of life to coexist and 
interact on equal terms within the same political community.”  
 
The Introduction of the International Community without a Simultaneous Reach Inwards  
 
The marginalisation of the experience and interests of broader society is further 
aggravated by the increasing role of the international community in all its various forms 
from the presence of the United Nations and other international organisations, donor 
agencies and the amorphous international ‘civil society’, such as international human 
rights and conflict resolutions organisations.  In the context of Argentina, Panizza (1995, 
169) details the achievement of the Madres de Plazo de Mayo who, “effectively put into 
question the dividing line between the personal and the political: their grief as mothers 
became the first intensely private issue to reconstitute a public space hitherto closed by 
the government.”  The spatialisation of the public sphere constitutes a key issue in the 
context of macro level peace processes as a result of the assumption on the part of the 
elite players of their entitlement to exclusively and simultaneously occupy, deny and 
repress the public space.  The problem of the spatialisation of the public sphere is 
compounded by the supra-macro involvement of the international community without a 
correlative reach inwards to the societal or subaltern level.  In fact, in Guatemala, 
Rosenthal (2001, 58) claims that the UN Verification Mission, Minugua, “has not been 
seen as an external actor at all, but as a party to the peace process.”  The important 
contribution of the international community notwithstanding, its depiction as a de facto 
party brings a number of legitimation problems for communities already distanced from 
the process.     
The involvement of the international community clearly does not present an 
anomaly of the peace process but reflects a general trend in response to the incapacity of 
the nation-state to address the totality of contemporary issues.  Yet, without a correlative 
reach inwards to society, the opportunity to influence the decision-making body becomes 
even more remote due to the lack of democratic organisation inherent in the international 
structure (Dahl, 1999, 22-3).  In the context of globalisation, Held (1999, 103) asserts that 
the locus of political power “is shared, bartered, and struggled over by diverse forces and 
agencies at national, regional and international levels.”  He (Held, 1999, 103) argues that 
“[s]ome of the most fundamental forces and processes which determine the nature of life-
chances within and across political communities are now beyond the reach of nation 
states.”  Against this background, the introduction of the international community into the 
frame of the peace process further distances the polity from participation in its own past, 
present and future.  While the involvement of the international community may in many 
cases benefit or support the subaltern, in other cases it may work against its interests.  For 
example, donor agendas which focus on particular types of peace-building work mutually 
reinforce the hierarchy and dependency of peace and human rights-related work by 
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creating preferences on the type of peace work to fund.  In the Sri Lankan context, for 
example, this leads Liyanage (2004) to argue that the international actors “appear to be 
doing ‘more harm’ than ‘no harm’ because of their non-conflict sensitive approaches and 
activities.”  
The power-constellation at the macro and supra-macro level may produce two 
results.  First, Panizza (1995, 180) discusses the disenfranchisement, apathy and 
“withdrawal into the private sphere” of previously active grassroots organisations 
following many of the transitions from authoritarian rule in Latin America.  
Disillusionment resulted from the claim of democratic representation which essentially 
equated to the occupation of public space by macro and supra-macro actors, excluding 
the participation of the wider community.  Second, in his discussion of the social 
consequences of an abdication of politics, Habermas (2002, 123) argues that, “although 
[pauperized groups] are no longer in a position to improve their social lot … 
segmentation does not mean that fragmented societies could simply abandon part of their 
population to their fate without political consequences.”  He identifies “self-destructive 
revolts” and “the moral erosion of society” through infiltration by the “poison of the 
ghetto” as threatening to the established basis of society (Habermas, 2002, 123).  The 
second consequence in particular, demonstrates the threat to the interests of even the elite 
players to indicate the instability of a peace process located solely at the macro level.  
Held (1999, 107) thus offers an analogous solution in his analysis of the way in which to 
counter the effects of globalisation through what he terms as ‘cosmopolitan democracy’: 
“the recovery of an intensive and more participatory democracy at local levels as a 
complement to the public assemblies of the wider global order … a system of diverse and 
overlapping power centres.”  In the same way, peace processes need to find a way to have 
relevance at all levels from the supra macro to the micro level. 
 
 
Part II:  Case Study: The Bilateral and Elite-Drive Peace Process in Sri Lanka  
 
This section uses the Sri Lankan peace process as a case-study through which to 
contextualise the theoretical critique of bilateral and elite-driven peace processes laid out 
above. 
 
Background to the Conflict 
 
The peace process in Sri Lanka was borne out of the need to end years of conflict 
dating back to the colonial period during which the British created an English-speaking 
elite that mainly comprised the minority Tamil community.  Following independence, Sri 
Lanka assumed the legacy of the British majoritarian system with which the majority 
Sinhalese pursued a nationalist movement to reverse the effects of colonialism in their 
favour.  The successive governments introduced progressively more discriminative 
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measures against the minority through restrictions on education, employment, language 
and land ownership.  The leaders of the United National Party (UNP) in particular used a 
systematic policy of institutionalised violence to mainstream human rights abuse against 
the Tamil community, which culminated in the 1983 pogrom.  In one of the worst 
instances of collective violence, the structural conditions put in place by the government 
fuelled the systematic murder and burning of Tamil citizens, their homes and businesses. 
The systematic discrimination against the Tamil community resulted in the 
establishment of a Tamil nationalist movement, mainly embodied in the LTTE.  Other 
social movements within the Sinhala community, such as the People’s Liberation Front 
(known as the JVP), also arose to agitate against the ethnic division within the country.  
The government’s counter terrorism response to the Southern uprisings by the JVP in 
1971 and the period between 1987 and 1990 further depict some of the most oppressive 
and concentrated human rights violations during the conflict.  The minority Muslim 
community has also been targeted throughout the conflict: the killings of Muslims in 
Mannar in 1985; the massacre of 140 Muslim worshippers at the Kattankudy mosque in 
1990; and the forcible expulsion of 90, 000 Muslims from Jaffna to the Eastern Province 
by the LTTE in the same year, constitute the most infamous violations.   
The conflict has been marked by a wide range of direct human rights violations by 
all actors as well providing the structural conditions for systemic abuse.  The death toll 
lies at 64,000 since 1983; as of 2001, the Refugee Council reported that 917,000 Sri 
Lankans, mainly Tamil, had left the country with 700,000 internally displaced and the 
UN Working Group on Disappearances reported 11,600 unaccounted for disappearances 
(Refugee Council, 2001, 5).  Since the Ceasefire Agreement of 2002, the LTTE has 
continued to assassinate its political opponents, extort taxes, recruit children into its 
forces, attack the Muslim community within the territory it controls and has generally 
smothered the “social and political space for dissent in the Tamil community”  
(University Teachers for Human Rights, 2002).  Impunity continues for past and current 
violations as well as institutionalised abuses such as torture in custody.  
In 1994, under the People’s Alliance (PA), President Kumaratunga pursued a 
strategy termed “war for peace” which sought to undermine the LTTE’s military capacity 
whilst acknowledging the legitimate claims of the Tamil community through a policy of 
devolution (Keenan, 2005, forthcoming).  When the UNP came into power, it rejected the 
PA’s approach choosing instead to negotiate and work with the LTTE rather than impose 
military isolation.  In February 2002, the UNP and the LTTE agreed to a ceasefire and the 
parties subsequently entered into six rounds of peace talks starting in September 2002 
with the Norwegian delegation as the mediator.   
 
The Peace Talks As Unprincipled Pragmatism 
 
The six rounds of peace talks in 2002 and 2003 were essentially bilateral and 
conducted in isolation.  Most notably, the two negotiating parties failed to include the 
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President or an independent delegation of the minority Muslim community; although 
Rauf Hakeem, the leader of the main Muslim political party (the SLMC), sat as a 
delegate for the government, an involvement still failing to equate to an independent 
Muslim delegation representing the interests of the Muslim community.  The JVP was 
also excluded as well as other Tamil parties in opposition to the authoritarian nature of 
the LTTE.  Yet, in spite of – or perhaps as a result of – the domination by the two parties 
and the desperation for peace by Sri Lankan society as a whole, the bilateral talks became 
conflated into a peace process, creating a dependency upon their momentum and 
excluding initiatives not framed in the same tone or voice as the talks proper.   
The rationale for a bilateral process contains multiple factors ranging from the fear 
that a more participatory approach would provoke segments of the Southern polity to act 
as spoilers to the process; the concern on the part of the LTTE that a wider process would 
undermine its authoritarianism in the North and East; and the resistance by both parties to 
a process that potentially would address the LTTE’s continuing record of human rights 
abuse and the UNP government’s, in particular, history of mass human rights violations 
in the 1980s and 1990s.  Nesiah (2002) ties the bilateral process to a regulative structure 
concentrated on the maintenance or achievement of state power through recognition of 
“intelligible” players using the model of rational actors provided by the rhetoric of 
conflict resolution.   She (Nesiah, 2002) argues that: 
 
Thus there is a whole package of institutional arrangements associated with the 
modern state that are part of the implicit script to the current negotiations, from 
markets open to global capital to the rule of law to colonizing the space for 
violence as an instrument of governance.  There is also implicitly a problematic 
claim suggesting a generalized disfunctionality of societies in conflict – these are 
readily classified as deficient cultures, failed states, subsumed by the irrational 
affiliations to ethnicity and other tribalisms.   
 
In relegating identity, community and cross-cutting political relationships to a 
level of minimal importance, the rational actor’s model not only fails to reflect true 
representation but also contributes to authoritarianism.  The parties have compounded the 
bilateral approach by avoiding transparency: the state oligarchic media has restricted 
information about the peace talks, with the LTTE instituting similar controls in the North 
and East (Liyanage, 2003b, 7).   
Thus, Liyanage (2003b, 6) characterises the peace talks as a “hegemonic conflict 
discourse” provincializing the interests of parties outside of the main negotiations.  This 
approach makes it difficult for outsiders to ensure their interests are addressed within the 
peace talks; rather the parties are unaccountable for the strategies used in the pursuit of 
peace.  In this way, in the six rounds of talks, the GOSL and the LTTE negated to pursue 
a principled approach to peace but rather adopted a step-by-step pragmatic discourse 
which never developed into a clear ‘roadmap’ to peace.  Nesiah (2002) argues that the 
use of a pragmatic “conflict resolution tool kit” assists the two parties in their pursuit of 
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political ends from behind the façade of a neutral process.  Kadirgamar (2003) also 
identifies the agendas of the dominant actors: in the case of the LTTE to compound and 
legitimate its authoritarian control over the North and East and for the previous UNP 
government, at least, the realisation of its neo-liberal economic policy in the South.  
Indeed, in the case of the LTTE, both the government and the international community 
appear to accept the appearance of transformation into a political entity without any 
requirement to demonstrate the substance of the commitment.  Keenan identifies the 
failure to even consider whether engagement with the LTTE offers a constructive policy 
in the pursuit of peace.  (Keenan, 2005)  As Perera (2003) argues, the irony of the 
operation of the LTTE like a state without the incentive to prioritise the needs of its 
people due to its authoritarian character enables it to disregard human rights violations 
and protection without any pressure from the government or the international community.   
As a result, Kadirgamar (2003) characterises the claim of a situation of peace as an 
illusive one, “providing cove r for the LTTE to attack its perceived enemies and strength 
to the Southern ruling class to cynically pursue its own power interests.”  The claim of 
neutrality resists transparency and accountability throughout the process, allowing the 
parties to proceed through the motions of peace without any requirement to commit to 
substantive content like human rights beyond rhetoric (Nesiah, 2002).  For the 
communities in Sri Lanka, the structure and isolation of the peace process which lacks 
any sequencing both holds them in a state of negative peace and opens the space for 
human rights abuse to occur in particular areas.   
Uyangoda (2002), a prominent Sri Lankan political scientist, defines negative 
peace as a pragmatic conflict management tool that characterises the absence of war from 
a political context.   In negative peace, the enabling conditions of conflict remain 
unaddressed – and consequently available for mobilisation – whereas positive peace 
removes the structural underpinnings of conflict focusing on institutional reform, 
“community reconciliation and peace building, democratisation, returning to normal 
politics, human rights, reintegration of communities and many more reconstructive 
measures” (Uyangoda, 2002, 5-6).  Whereas the establishment of the end goal of positive 
peace justifies the state of negative peace as an interim building-block to provide the 
political space to enable progression through a form of stabilisation, the lack of a long 
term strategy results in a suspension in a warless, peaceless political period.  As the point 
of transition reflects a key turning point in the construction of society, the location of the 
peace process within a concentrated section of community threatens the legitimacy of the 
eventual political and societal resolution reached.   
In any case, in April 2003 the LTTE withdrew from the peace talks as a result of 
its exclusion from a donor conference organised in Washington D.C. that month and then 
boycotted a subsequent donor meeting in Tokyo in June 2003.  In the following October, 
the LTTE introduced its own proposal for an Interim Self-Governing Authority for the 
North and East of Sri Lanka, invoking severe criticism from Sinhalese groups claiming 
the document to reflect an attempt to secure independence from the Sri Lankan State.  In 
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the following week, the President intervened on the grounds of national security to 
declare a state of emergency, temporarily suspend Parliament and assume control of the 
key Ministries of Defence, Interior, and Media.  She then called for snap elections which 
her party won in April 2004 as a coalition government with the JVP.  Human rights 
violations and political killings continue throughout the ceasefire period.  At the point at 
which the tsunami struck Sri Lanka, the peace talks had still not resumed and the tenuous 
political climate threatened a return to war.  Although the tsunami initially raised hopes 
of political resolution, the parties are once again gridlocked.    
 
Fall Out of the Peace Talks: Spoilers and Human Rights Abuse  
 
In terms of the impact of the bilateral peace talks, the first consequence has 
ironically been the activation of spoilers against a process of peace, despite the 
prevention of spoilers constituting a central justification projected for the elite-driven 
structure.  In the context of the 1983 anti-Tamil riots, Newton Gunasinghe demonstrates 
how the unsubstantiated rumour of the imminent arrival of the LTTE “constructed an 
imaginary reality, which anticipated a retaliatory assault from the ‘Tigers’.  Hence 
although the ‘Tigers’ were absent from the scene, they were present in the mass 
consciousness, leading to real social consequences, frenzied flight at first and murderous 
mob violence later” (Perera, 1996, 208).  In a similar manner, the lack of transparency 
has facilitated the production of rumours, fears and suspicions which become a real 
narrative to the peace process and enable the garnering of support for the positions of 
spoilers and those with nationalist agendas (Perera, 1999, 46).  Liyanage (2003a, 121) 
identifies at least three spoiler elements in the peace process as the President, the JVP and 
Sihala Urumaya: for example, operating on the platform of the threat to the Sinhala 
nation as a result of engagement with the LTTE (Perera, 1996, 208), the JVP has 
coincided political violence as a mobilising force during previous attempts at peace 
(Perera, 1999, 34).  Uyangoda (2002, 17) attributes the emergence of spoilers to the 
context of a vulnerable peace process with fixed goals, unalterable through negotiation.  
Of great concern in this respect has been the treatment of all critics of the construction or 
progress of the peace talks as spoilers, however supportive of the general project of 
peace.  Space does not exist to simultaneously support the peace process but also 
constructively criticise its short-comings.   
Perhaps the most significant and predictable consequence of the pragmatic nature 
of the discourse brought about by the power constellation without any accountability or 
pressure to conduct the negotiations otherwise has been the continuance of human rights 
violations, in the North and East of the country in particular.  Although the ceasefire 
period brought an overall reduction in the level of violations, the University Teachers for 
Human Rights (one of the strongest and most vociferous dissidents of the LTTE)  
denounces bare statistics placed outside of the context of the everyday reality of living in 
LTTE controlled areas as a “façade of normality” due to the institutionalisation of fear 
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and acknowledgment of the consequences imposed for acting contrary to LTTE policies 
(University Teachers for Human Rights, 2003). 
Until the internal LTTE split between the former Eastern Commander of the LTTE 
(Karuna) and the LTTE organisational leader (Prabhakaran) in 2004, the official narrative 
claimed the existence of peace in spite of the persisting culture of violence structurally 
borne out of the conflict.  However, in the context of both the North and East in which 
individual human rights violations and the underpinning structural conditions 
impregnating society with fear and intimidation continue, the political crisis only 
precipitated a pre-existing level of violence.  Reports of political assassinations, 
extortion, ongoing child recruitment and the general “smothering of social and political 
space for dissent in the Tamil community” persist (University Teachers for Human 
Rights, 2002).  In addition, the complex and tenuous relationship between the Tamil and 
Muslim community adds a further dimension to the stability of the North and East in 
which increasing attacks against the Muslim community, their property and businesses 
residing in the Eastern Province following their displacement by the LTTE from Jaffna 
embodies a deep fear of lack of security and sense of place in an increasingly 
authoritarian-led North and East.   
Beyond the LTTE which only controls the “uncleared” areas of the North and 
East, the continuing presence of government security forces, which bear the greatest 
responsibility for past human rights abuses during the conflict, creates a state of 
insecurity in the separation of territory between two entities with extensive histories of 
human rights abuse.  During the ceasefire period, Amnesty International  (2004) reports of 
continuing violations, in particular torture in custody and impunity.  Keenan (2005, 
forthcoming) builds on these violations to include “the continued occupation by the 
security forces of temples, schools, and private homes in the north and east, deadly 
shootings of Tamil protestors by police … the failure of police to stop retaliatory attacks 
shortly thereafter by Sinhala crowds on Tamil demonstrators … frequent acts of 
harassment of Tamils in the north and east.” 
Yet, international and domestic attention and acknowledgment of ceasefire 
infractions only officially emerged in any sustained manner as a result of the split within 
the LTTE and even then only located the split in the isolated space and time of the 
present of that event.  The analysis and reaction focused narrowly on the violations 
directly related to the internicide as a threat to the peace rather than recognise the nature 
and cause of the ingrained culture of violence connected and sustained as a result of the 
conflict.  As a result, the narrowing of the scope of the understanding of the 
Karuna/Prabhakaran conflict extracted the situation from the persistent and connected 
discourse of structural violence, negating the need to address human rights abuses before 
or during the ceasefire period and silencing and denying the experience of victims. 
Kadirgamar (2003) is led to depict the current political context as the “violence of peace” 
based on the following: the totality of direct and structural violations; a culture of 
impunity (Perera, 1999, 191); the militarization of society; the creation of three 
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progressive nationalisms within the Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim communities as a direct 
response to the repression of the former and the promotion of ethnic ‘otherness.’ 
In the context of the tsunami, however, international media reports mainly 
applauded the LTTE for its efficiency in dealing with the devastation.  For example, 
against four paragraphs quoting the LTTE’s claim that little aid has reached the North 
and East despite the President’s “propaganda” war to claim the contrary, Steele (2005b) 
writes in The Guardian, that the LTTE is “recognised to be distributing aid efficiently”; 
in another article, he (Steele, 2005a) writes of the LTTE’s leadership and cooperation.  
Ramesh (2005) writes in The Guardian, that, “[w]hat is clear is that the Tigers have 
managed a massive relief operation.”  Yet, other articles have contrasted to the 
Guardian’s coverage markedly.  For example, Kranenberg (2005), in Volkstrant, writes of 
the forced movement of refugees from government camps into LTTE-controlled territory 
and a fresh recruitment of child soldiers by the LTTE.  Again, the failure to highlight the 
abuse and authoritarian nature of the LTTE only increases its political profile and seals 
the individuals and groups upon whom it exerts its power into new and increased levels 
of denial.  
The allocation of aid gave rise to a huge site of dispute as documented by the Sri 
Lanka Democracy Forum (2005a): 
 
aid has been slow in reaching far- flung communities in the [North and East] … 
The Tamil press and certain parliamentarians have accused the Sri Lankan 
government of discrimination in the delivery of relief – showing preference for 
the Sinhala south over Tamil areas.  While the shortages in the North and East 
have been serious, there have also been repeated allegations that the LTTE cadres 
have inhibited the delivery of assistance – setting fire to a camp housing persons 
displaced by the tsunami after people accepted assistance from army, intercepting 
trucks carrying relief supplies, refusing unfettered government or international 
access to areas under its control and preventing independent NGOs from 
operating. 
 
Moreover, political killings in the North and East quickly resumed, including the 
assassination of the LTTE’s Eastern political leader, Kaushalyan, an act which the UN 
Secretary General, Kofi Annan, condemned as a risk to the peace process.  More recently, 
the prospect of a return to peace negotiations appears even more remote following the 
assassination of the Foreign Minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar in August 2005 (Sri Lanka 
Democracy Forum, 2005b).  
In the face of the continuing violations and political killings, the label of negative 
peace carries the danger of silencing and oppressing the victims of human rights abuse to 
a similar extent than when the conflict remained at its height.  This raises the question of 
the acceptability of a state of peace which forcibly represses victims, either through 
silencing or official denial, and thus requires them to buy into a version of peace which 
may not reflect their everyday reality.  A peace which removes clearly identifiable human 
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rights violations on a large scale but approves and seals an undemocratic, oppressive 
society in which the structures remain in place for individual violations risks reigniting 
the conflict or creating cycles of violence in patterns similar to those developed 
throughout the course of the conflict proper.   
 
 
Part III:  Towards Deeper Peace Processes 
 
In moving from conflict in Sri Lanka, the bilateral actors can neither ensure lasting 
peace in their isolated negotiations; neither can they afford to return to war.  Negotiations 
must recognise the multiplicity of actors and identities in Sri Lanka, many of a cross-
cutting nature.  Two issues result from the recognition of the lack of representivity under 
the current talks.  First, human rights violations can no longer be subordinated to the 
overall objective of peace, but their unconditional termination must form a central 
element.  Second, in light of the recognition of the range of actors and interests, broader 
participation in the peace process must be ensured. 
The effort is therefore aimed at generating the space to allow broader society to 
fulfil its potential to participate without the top-down silencing constraints.  The vision 
remains aligned to Otto’s (1999, 146) exploration of the post-colonial in relation to 
international law in asking, “whether it is possible to imagine processes whereby 
nondominant, nonelite, subaltern individuals and groupings could participate as 
subjects.”  Otto (1999, 167) questions the possibility of participation in emancipation 
without assimilation.  She (Otto, 1999, 168) argues that the process should not locate the 
disenfranchised outside of the dominant discourse but rather change and re-appropriation 
should occur through interaction and interdependence positing the central issues as “how 
to push at the boundaries of modernity rather than how to give voice to what is outside 
it.”  She (Otto, 1999, 171) argues that the exposure of hegemony highlights the 
possibilities for resistance: by “conversing with the clamor” (emphasis in the text) and 
“replacing the dominant elite position of knowing with the multifarious and disruptive 
positions of subaltern knowledges,” more equality in decision-making and participation 
can be achieved.  
Beyond the illegitimacy of excluding broader society from a substantive role, the 
peace process can also benefit from the diversity, knowledge and capacity of civil 
society.  The containment of macro level narratives restricts the scope and thus potential 
for change in the transition.  As Slater (2001) discusses in the context of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict the “psychological prerequisite” for peace requires the 
disproportionate power-holder of Israel to examine and acknowledge its historical and 
contemporary role as an oppressor over the Palestinian people.  He (Slater, 2001, 171-
200) argues that Israel remains “[b]linded by Zionist ideological and the genuine history 
of Jewish victimization … [and] its claim, based on biblical history and Jewish 
inhabitance, to eternal Jewish sovereignty over the entire land of Palestine.”  Thus, 
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through the permission of limited and concentrated discourse, the players and the issues 
can become more entrenched providing little room for progression due to the extreme and 
constantly reductive discourses. 
Harvey (1999) also illustrates why the concentration on the macro level process 
and its official pronunciations may miss the achievements and energy at all levels of civil 
society where interesting and transformative work may be occurring.  In relation to the 
conflict in Northern Ireland he (Harvey, 1999, 411) asserts that, “[t]he human rights and 
equality movements demonstrated throughout the conflict that while political 
representatives tried to find ‘grand solutions’ serious work was getting done on the 
ground.  Networks of community activism are a significant aspect of the governance 
structures of Northern Ireland.”  By building on the conception of Gramsci’s “organic 
intellectuals” as “grassroots philosophers who are uniquely able to relate theory to 
concrete experience of oppression,” Matsuda (1987, 325) also highlights the intellectual 
energy lost through a sole focus on the macro level.  As the “normative intuitions” 
(Matsuda, 1987, 325) of the bottom in experiencing the same event, time or place differs 
emotionally, perceptively, tangibly and intellectually from the experience at the top 
(Williams, 1987, 409-411), the objective and process of moving into the future will also 
differ viewed from the top and bottom thus offering a more complex but richer process 
(Matsuda, 1987, 346-7). 
In determining the need for a new and acknowledged synergy between the macro 
and the micro, the remaining issue questions the site of initiation of a balanced 
relationship.  Matsuda (1990, 1767, 1778) asserts “positive change in oppressive 
relationships [as] almost always initiated by the victim” and progresses to identify 
historical movements of labour rights, civil rights and suffrage as illustration of a rise 
from the bottom up.  In the Sri Lankan context, Uyangoda (2002, 214) also asserts that 
“[i]t is the responsibility of the democratic civil society to take the present peace process 
away from its present state-centric and actor-centric framework.  For the peace process to 
be made inclusive and truly emancipatory, it is necessary to pluralise and democratise its 
actors and communities of stakeholders.” 
The location of change from within the realms of civil society proves useful due to 
the traditional understanding of civil society as the embodiment of the relationship 
between the state as the hegemon and society as the subordinated.  As Goodhand and 
Lewer (1999, 69-88) argue, the term “civil society” connotes “social fabric” and “social 
energy” and as such implies that society will be broadly represented and the divergence 
of needs and interests included.  Yet they equally recognise in the Sri Lankan context at 
least, civil society contains the potential for greater interaction but cannot bear the totality 
of the responsibility for effectuating deeper participation (Goodhand and Lewer, 1999, 
69-88).  
The Sri Lankan experience illustrates that the “social energy” needed to effect 
change from the margins may not yet exist comprehensively.  In contrast to the energy of 
the work of civil society organisations on human rights issues during the conflict, civil 
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society organisations now adopt a reactive response to “symptoms rather than causes” 
(Orjuela, 2003, 207).  The reactive response partly emanates from the practice of human 
rights organisations which progressively faced suppression and a constant increase in a 
shifting range of issues which resulted in an inability to work systematically on specific 
issues, but also from the current context in which the expectations of a real politik peace 
process do not foresee or value the independent contribution from society at large 
(Liyanage, 2003b, 7).  Currently, civil society attaches itself reactively to the ebbs and 
flow of the stalled peace talks as a result of both the isolationist approach to the peace 
talks but also as a consequence of the suppression of civil society during the conflict.  In 
relation to human rights, Keenan (2005, forthcoming) identifies three interdependent and 
supporti1y ftorons which evge  
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Conclusion 
 
While this paper does not seek to undermine the crucial role played by macro level 
actors in moving away from violent conflict, it does attempt to illustrate the inherent 
deficiencies of an overly dominant macro level discourse in the process to achieve peace.  
As the effects of conflict and peace habitually impact the general society in which they 
occur more deeply and systematically than the macro and supra macro level actors that 
negotiate to determine its fate, the views and participation of broader society, however 
contentious, should also form a central not superficial aspect of the move towards peace.  
While the argument may be advanced that a broader approach risks the ability to reach 
agreement and thus move away from conflict, narrow participation similarly risks 
stagnation through extremism and power-politics.  On the other hand, a broader process 
brings challenges and tensions to the table but if framed carefully can offer a firmer basis 
for a durable peace through better representation and participation as well as treatment of 
core issues, such as human rights, affecting society as whole.  However, the reality of the 
power balance means that not only must broader society generate bodies of resistance to 
ensure its own input but the macro actors must also be willing to allow the members of 
society as partners rather than simply informative tools.  In this regard, the supra macro, 
namely the international community, must encourage a conducive climate for equal 
partnership through its relationship with the macro actors and also through broad support 
for a divergent range of activities related to the establishment of peace. 
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